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Abstract
The objective of this work is to discriminate between different neurocognitive circuits involved in empathy, one of
them linked to emotional processing and the other associated with cognitive function. This is evaluated through
the use of neuropsychological tools (Hinting Task, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test and Cambridge Mind
Reading Test) empathic cognition and empathic emotion. In this study, 57 male prisoners were divided into
three groups: psychotic patients (20), antisocial patients (17), and a control group (20). Patients with psychosis
were found to have significantly lower scores than the antisocial and control groups in a social reasoning test,
but using tests of emotional recognition, we found that both psychotic patients and antisocial subjects scored
significantly lower than the control group.
Resumen
El objetivo de este trabajo es discriminar diferentes circuitos neurocognitivos involucrados en la empatı´a, uno de
ellos vinculado al procesamiento emocional y otro asociado con la funcio´n cognitiva. Evaluamos mediante el uso
de herramientas neuropsicolo´gicas (Hinting Task, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test y Cambridge Mind Reading
Test) la cognicio´n empa´tica y la emocio´n empa´tica. Participaron del estudio, 57 presos varones que se dividieron
en tres grupos: pacientes psico´ticos (20), antisociales (17) y un grupo control (20). Se encontro´ que los pacientes
con psicosis tenı´an puntuaciones significativamente ma´s bajas que los grupos antisociales y de control en una
prueba de razonamiento social, pero utilizando pruebas de reconocimiento emocional, encontramos que tanto
los pacientes psico´ticos como los sujetos antisociales obtuvieron puntuaciones significativamente ma´s bajas
que el grupo control.
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1. Introduction
Social cognition can be understood as the set of cognitive
processes involved in the way people think about themselves,
other people, social situations and their interactions. These so-
cial cognitive processes are involved in the way in which infer-
ences are made about the intentions and beliefs of other people
and how social situational factors are assessed in making such
inferences. They are part of social cognition: emotional pro-
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cessing, theory of mind, social perception, social knowledge
and attributional style or bias (Ruı´z-Ruı´z, Garcı´a-Ferrer, &
Fuentes-Dura´, 2006).
Emotional processing refers to all those aspects involved
in the perception, understanding, emotional regulation and
its use for social functioning. Empirical knowledge in this
aspect of cognition is based on studies on the perception
of faces, ii.e. the ability to recognize and understand facial
expressions of emotions in others (Sucksmith, Allison, Baron-
Cohen, Chakrabarti, & Hoekstra, 2013).
The capacity for empathy or the ability to detect what
another person feels is evaluated by the ability to reproduce a
similar emotional state in our own body. For this, the mech-
anisms of interpretation of relevant signs must be unharmed
(Iacoboni, 2009; Iacoboni & Dapretto, 2006).
Social cognition refers to a complex neurocognitive pro-
cess involving many brain regions implicated in perception,
processing and response in social contexts (Butman, 2001).
Different areas on the prefrontal cortex (PFC), amygdala,
somatosensory cortex and insula are part of a broad neurocog-
nitive circuit that presents dissociated functions while, at the
same time, integrating the social information they process
(Adolphs, 1999)
The study of social cognition over the years has allowed
the identification of several semi-independent processes, some
of which are very clear. Discriminating between empathic
cognition and empathic emotion allows us to understand how
in some mental or personality disorders these functions may
be dissociated (Molina, 2013). These findings have allowed
the dissection of more specific, though interrelated, complex
processes of social cognition.
Empathy as a component of social cognition was also
subdivided into functions that were thought to be differenti-
ated. Empathic cognition (EC) is composed of the circuits and
functions necessary to make a rational reading of situations
of social interaction, but does not activate an affective repre-
sentation in the subject. Empathic emotion, (EE) on the other
hand, includes the affective component to that register and is
linked to the functioning of the frontal operculum (Ruggieri,
2013).
The EC processes social information in anterior regions
of the frontal lobe (Brodmann’s area 10 and 11). These ven-
tromedial areas of the PFC are also linked to impulse control
and inhibition (Shamay-Tsoory, 2010).
Kleist (1997) argues that the ventral cortices are the ar-
eas in charge of integrating the information processed in the
dorsolateral areas of the PFC.
These data indicate that although empathy uses differenti-
ated circuits to process cognitive and emotional components,
both circuits are located in the frontal lobes and not only in-
teract with each other, but also involve areas of executive and
inhibitory processing. In this complex network of mental op-
erations that underlie social interactions, processes involved
in the perception, interpretation, and generation of responses
to the intentions, dispositions and behaviors of others are
included (Ruı´z-Ruı´z et al., 2006).
One of the sensory modalities that contributes the most
information to the processing of social cognition is the visual
modality. Social visual signs include information about the
face - expression or the direction of the gaze - as well as body
postures and movements (Belmonte, Gomot, & Baron-Cohen,
2010). Visual processing starts from the occipital primary
visual cortex involving the superior temporal cortex and the
fusiform gyrus. One of the ways to investigate a subject’s
ability to interpret the expression of a face, is to reproduce the
expression of the face in the organism and detect the feeling it
triggers (Ruı´z-Ruı´z et al., 2006). In this process the amygdala
performs a cognitive assessment of the emotional content of
complex perceptual stimuli.
Social perception is associated with the capacities to value
social rules and roles, as well as to assess the social context.
These evaluations are based primarily on perceptual processes
that should direct the attention of the person to those key social
cues, helping him to situate and properly interpret situations
in which he may be involved. Throughout that process the
context is critical. It corresponds to a type of perception
that requires “reading between lines” (Penn, Ritchie, Francis,
Combs, & Martin, 2002).
Social knowledge refers to the ability to identify the com-
ponents that characterize a given social situation. The iden-
tification of social signals requires a certain knowledge of
what is typical in a given social situation. Social schemas vary
depending on the components or characteristics that allow
their understanding, but basically four basic components are
considered: actions, roles, rules and aims or goals (Brothers,
1990). These act as a guide in social situations. Social knowl-
edge is the frame of reference that allows the subject to know
how to act, what his role and the roles of other actors in the
situation are, what the rules that by convention are used in
that situation are and finally the reason why he is involved in
this social situation (Piemontesi, 2010).
Social cognition, as indicated above, includes a behavioral
component governed by rules, social skills and strategies that
make the behavior of the subject more or less well-adapted.
This knowledge allows people to select relevant responses or
actions in different social settings (J. Beer & Ochsner, 2006).
Theory of mind (TOM) is a term proposed by Premack and
Woodruff (1978) for the component of social cognition that
refers to the ability to make inferences about the mental states
of others, such as intentions, dispositions and beliefs. The
ability to understand the role of other individuals as well as to
understand other points of view or to attribute an intention to
another individual is known as “theory of mind.” These kinds
of inferences allow one to understand the other’s mental states,
their desires, intentions and behavior and make it possible to
understand the representations that the other makes of the
world. This ability is essential for proper adaptation and
social interaction (Roma´n et al., 2012).
When a subject with functional brain structures perceives
facial emotion, body language and prosody, there are signs
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that provide the subject with an understanding of emotional
meaning (nez & Manes, 2012). Acting efficiently in social
interactions requires the implicit and explicit interpretation
of context signals in order to choose the most appropriate
behavior.
1.1 Anatomic-functional correlations
The brain areas generally associated with social cognition are
the orbitofrontal cortex, the frontal, cingulate cortex, the in-
sula, the temporal lobe, the amygdalas, the fusiform gyrus and
the somatosensory cortex (J. S. Beer, Shimamura, & Knight,
2004).
Medial cortical structures including the medial prefrontal
cortex, anterior cingulate cortex and precuneus have been
associated with social cognition. In addition, a right fron-
toparietal circuit is included as part of a network of mirror
neurons involved in self-recognition and social understanding
(Lawrence, P.Shaw, Baker, Baron-Cohen, & David, 2004).
There is evidence to suggest that there is a right lateralization
of the mirror neuron system involved in the multimodal under-
standing of the face - for example, the face and voice while
corticomedial structures appear to represent less corporal ter-
rain such as social relationships. Interactions between these
two systems are crucial in social functioning and development
(Uddin, Iacoboni, Lange, & Keenan, 2007).
There are direct connections between the mesial frontal
areas and the lower frontal gyrus. Thus, the anterior and pos-
terior nodes of the corticomedial structures and the mirror
neuron system are in direct communication. Although the
exact nature of the interactions between these two networks is
unknown, direct connections between them are likely to facili-
tate the integration of information that is necessary to maintain
the representations of others through multiple domains (Lou
et al., 2004).
Representations of self and others are crucial to social
functioning. The mirror neuron system and the right fron-
toparietal region seem to support these abilities, albeit in
different ways. In this sense, it is proposed that the mirror
neuron system allows a physical representation while the corti-
comedial structures are focused on mental state and evaluation
simulation. Both processes are crucial to understanding others
(Leslie, 1987). Although their differences are not fully under-
stood, both neural systems contribute to the ability to move
beyond motor imitation, from simple forms to more complex
forms of social learning and understanding. By providing both
the neural bases of representation and the distinction between
the self and the other, these two systems integrate themselves
with the brain as a whole, enabling the individual to move
successfully in the social world (Uddin et al., 2007).
In 1988 Leonor Welt published a doctoral thesis describ-
ing the correlation between orbital lesions next to the midline
and changes of character, based on the observation of 12 pa-
tients, one of whom was Phineas Gage. Welt observed that
patients with lesions in orbital areas manifested problems in-
hibiting impulses. This suggests that the ventral cortex and
ventral paralimbic structures are concerned with giving value
to the feelings and actions that the dorsal cortex executes. The
study of injured patients shows that they have difficulties in
decision making and social reasoning (Butman, 2001).
According Damasio (1994) to make decisions is to choose
a response option among many possibilities at a given time
in relation to a given situation. It implies knowing the sit-
uation that requires it, the different options for action and
the immediate or future consequences of each action. Pa-
tients with ventromedial prefrontal cortex lesions fail to use
somatic or emotional cues to guide behavior and are oblivious
to the future consequences of their actions. Consequently,
they act according to their immediate perspectives, taking no
preventive action and acting more impulsively (Butman, 2001;
Damasio, 1994).
Limbic system structures such as the amygdalas perform
a cognitive evaluation of the emotional content of complex
perceptual stimuli. According to Emery and Amaral (2000),
the basal nucleus, having the greatest interconnection with
the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, intervenes in the pairing
of social signals with the appropriate social context. It has
been found that in the left insula there is a greater activation
with respect to unpleasant stimuli regardless of their intensity
(Small, Gregory, Mak, Gitelman, & Marsel, 2003). Through
brain imaging it has also been shown that the anterior insula is
activated by the sight of facial expressions of disgust in others
and that the amplitude of response depends on the type of
expression of disgust that the other person had on their face.
These findings were corroborated from depth recordings of
the electrodes in the insula of patients with epilepsy, finding
that the electrodes located in the anterior part, but not those
located in the posterior insula, were selectively activated by
observing expressions of disgust in the face of another person
(Krolak-Salmon, 2003).
1.2 Social cognition and antisocial personality dis-
order
Works by Marshall and Marshall (2011) argue that the deficits
in the emotional processing of the empathy of subjects with
antisocial personality is what drives them to commit violent
acts.
In a study of various domains of social cognition linked
to mentalization in offenders with and without a diagnosis of
antisocial disorders, both groups were found to score lower
than the control group in the study. The authors used the
Perspectives Taking Test, Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test
and the Movie for the Assessment of Social Cognition to
value mentalization tasks. They also found greater deficits in
the three trials applied to offenders diagnosed with antisocial
disorder when compared to the group of offenders without a
diagnosis of antisocial disorder (Newbury-Helps, Feigenbaum,
& Fonagy, 2017).
Other authors (Bagcioglu et al., 2014) ocused on investi-
gating the existence of differences between facial recognition
of emotions in subjects with antisocial disorder with and with-
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out a history of attention deficit disorder. In this study, subjects
were asked to identify the 6 basic emotions through facial ex-
pression, as well as neutral facial expressions. The Wender
Utah Rating Scale was also applied to assess symptoms of
(ADD). The results indicated that both groups of antisocial
subjects manifested problems in identifying specific dissatis-
faction. This finding is of interest since it links the functioning
of the brain insula to the recognition of that emotional expres-
sion and as part of the complex neurocognitive system that
processes empathy. Finally, this work also found differences
between groups with and without attention deficit disorder,
finding that subjects with a history of ADD had used much
more time for the recognition of emotions.
Dolan and Fullam (2004) have done a lot of work on the
topic that we have discussed in our own research. The authors
evaluated the mentalization capacity of antisocial subjects
with and without a diagnosis of psychopathy. Among the
findings, they indicated that:
The deficits in mentalization tasks of these groups are
subtle and that the skills in mind theory were almost intact.
This would explain their adaptive role to the criminal lifestyle
they lead, and can be interpreted as a correct functioning of
cognitive empathy. But they found alterations in both groups
when they assessed the ability to recognize emotions or adopt
the perspective of the victim, which we believe to be included
in emotional empathy.
1.3 Social cognition and psychosis
It has also been shown that emotional information is altered in
schizophrenia. The biological foundations of these abnormal-
ities can be explained by an abnormally functioning mirror
neuron system. McCormick and colleagues in 2012 studied
schizophrenic patients at various stages of their disease pro-
gression. Using electroencephalography studies, they found
alterations in brain electrical activity during tasks that acti-
vated mirror neurons. Their other finding of interest, was
that these alterations correlated positively with the years of
evolution of the disease.
Other papers used psychometric tests to analyze and dif-
ferentiate alterations in empathy systems in psychotic patients.
Through the administration of the interpersonal reactivity in-
dex (IRI), it was found that psychotic subjects who have had
their first episode score similarly to control subjects in the
subscales of empathy and mentalization, only observing differ-
ences in anxiety values. In contrast, subjects with chronicity
in their disorder scored significantly lower than controls when
assessing subscales that explored social cognition and empa-
thy (Achima, Ouelleta, Rova, & Jacksona, 2011).
An important meta-analysis study by Bora and Pantelis
(2013) analyzed the functioning of the theory of mind in
patients after their first episode of psychosis, subjects assessed
with a high risk of psychosis, unaffected relatives and controls.
The authors found deficits in social cognition tasks in the three
groups evaluated. The subjects who had their first psychotic
episode were the ones that performed the worst, with the
groups of unaffected relatives and those with a high risk of
psychosis recording scores between those of the psychotic
group and the control group. The authors add that the results
obtained by the patients with the first episode of psychosis
were similar to those of the chronic patients.
In summary, the current literature deals with differentiated
neurocognitive systems for the integral processing of social
information. The dichotomy observed in subjects with per-
sonality disorders with respect to their social skills was the
question that inspired this research. The differentiation of
circuits of social reasoning and emotional processing in social
situations explains the paradox of finding cases that show ex-
treme insensitivity in the forensic domain with a conversation
of functional social skills for their environment.
2. Method
2.1 Ethical responsabilities
Protection of people and animals. The authors state that the
procedures followed conformed to the ethical standards of the
responsible human experimentation committee and in agree-
ment with the World Medical Association and the Declaration
of Helsinki.
Confidentiality of the data. The authors state that they
have followed the protocols of their work center on the publi-
cation of patient data and that all patients included in the study
have received sufficient information and have given written
informed consent to participate in the study.
Right to privacy and informed consent. The authors have
obtained the informed consent of the patients and/or sub-
jects referred to in the article. Review by Independent Ethics
Committee. The work was reviewed and approved by an Inde-
pendent Ethics Committee (I.E.C.) of the Center for Studies
in Applied Cognitive Neuroscience.
2.2 Description of the sample
A non-probabilistic sample was set up for the convenience of
57 male subjects with a mean age of 29.37 years (SD = 7.44).
It was divided into three groups: 35% (20 subjects) of the
patients were diagnosed with psychosis, 30% (17 subjects)
with an antisocial personality disorder and 35 (20 subjects)
belonged to the control group.
The group patients with psychosis consisted in schizophrenic
patients. Half of them showed a predominance of positive
symptoms and the other half a predominance of negative
symptoms according to the results of the Positive and Neg-
ative Syndrome Scale (PANSS). Subjects with medical or
neurological diseases, or cases of simulation or mental retar-
dation were excluded from the investigation. Patients in both
the psychotic and antisocial groups were deprived of their
liberty, having either been convicted of or being tried for a
criminal offense at the time of participating in the evaluation.
The participants in the control group were selected in
the same detention unit, within the prison complex No. 1
of Ezeiza. It was composed of subjects matched by socio-
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Figure 1. Psychotic patients group offenses
Figure 2. Antisocial patient group offenses
economic-cultural level without a diagnosis of psychosis or
antisocial personality disorder.
In terms of education level in the sample, 12% had not
completed primary school while 26% had only finished pri-
mary school. 40% hadn’t completed secondary school and
17.5% had only completed secondary school. Finally, 3.5%
had continued to study after finishing secondary school. Re-
garding criminal history, 28 patients indicated having a history
(49%) and 8 patients did not (14%). The rest of the patients
did not respond. Of these 28 patients who indicated having
criminal record, 16 patients belong to the group diagnosed
with psychosis and 12 patients to the group diagnosed with
antisocial personality disorder.
Additionally, the group of psychotic patients had been
detained for reasons of theft, homicide and attempted murder,
fire, sexual abuse and threats (type of crime committed by
psychotic patients is shown in Figure 1).
Theft, sexual abuse and homicide were the crimes com-
mitted by the subjects who were part of the group of subjects
with antisocial disorders (see Figure 2).
The work was carried out in the Diagnostic and Stabiliza-
tion Evaluation Room of the Psychiatric Hospital of Federal
Penitentiary Complex No. I of Ezeiza belonging to the Federal
Penitentiary Service.
The professionals who administered the tests, psycholo-
gists, neuropsychologists and psychiatrists were civilian per-
sonnel who belong to the Interministerial Program of Mental
Health in Argentina (PRISMA) and develop functions in this
hospital and evaluation device.
The clinical evaluation was performed by an interdisci-
plinary mental health team, which used the DSM IV TR diag-
nostic criteria for the clinical diagnosis of antisocial personal-
ity disorder (APD) and psychosis.
All three groups those with antisocial personality disorder,
psychosis and the control group were assessed by applying
three social cognition tests.
2.3 Administered tests
An adapted Spanish - language version of the Hinting Task
or Test of Insinuations was administered (Gil, Ferna´ndez-
Modamio, Benhochea, & Arrieta, 2012). The test includes
ten short stories, in which two characters participating in
a social interaction appear. At the end of each, one of the
characters transmits a masked message to the other. The
evaluated subject is asked what the character of the story really
meant by the comment he made. If the answer is correct in
its total interpretation, it is scored with 2 points. If additional
information is required to get the correct answer, it is scored
with a 1. An incorrect answer is equivalent to a 0. The total
score of the test goes from 0 to 20. In the present work we
used the abbreviated version in which only 5 stories were
scored (2,3,6,7 and 9). For that reason the overall test score
is from 0 to 10 points. The reduced version was selected as
it has an internal consistency of 0.73 for control subjects and
0.78 for patients in previous studies (Janssen, Krabbendam,
Jolles, & Os, 2003). Also, the five-story version showed a high
correlation with the complete test in both control subjects (r =
0.75, p < 0.001) and in the patients (r = 0.911, p < 0.001).
We also used the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test”
or Test of the Gaze (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, &
Robertson, 1997). In this test the subject is asked to identify
between 4 emotions expressed in an image of the upper part
of a face, in which the look of a person can be visualized.
This test consists of 36 photographs of the upper part
of the face (eyes and eyebrows). In these photographs you
can see the looks of men and women expressing a feeling or
thought. The subject must choose the word that he considers
best describes what the person in the photograph is thinking
or feeling. Although one word may seem to be applicable, the
subject is limited to the one word he considers most appro-
priate. The subject has to read the look; each photograph has
four possible responses that appear on the screen and the sub-
ject must choose the one that best represents that emotional
state. If the subject is not familiar with the meaning of a word
he can ask for the exact definition in the instruction manual
(Garcı´a, Usta´rroz, & Lo´pez-Gon˜i, 2012).
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With the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, the ability
to recognize emotion is targeted, employing tasks in which
only the face is shown without an indication of the context
in which a certain emotion is being expressed (Garcı´a et al.,
2012). We used the Spanish version of the Test of the gaze by
Serrano and Allegri (2006), which was carried out using the
revised version of the Test (Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, Raste,
& Plumb, 2001). The maximum score is 36. For the correction
of the test, the errors were counted and valued according to the
normative data for the local population according to previous
studies (Roma´n et al., 2012).
Finally the Cambridge Mind Reading Test (CAM) was
applied. This test consists of 50 videos of the faces of men and
women expressing a feeling or thought through the dynamic
expression of their face. The subject must choose the word
that he considers best describes what the person in the video
is thinking or feeling. Although one word may seem to be
applicable, the subject is limited to the one word he considers
most appropriate. The subject has the task of interpreting or
inferring the emotional expression of the person; each video
has four possible answers that appear on the screen and the
subject must choose the one that best represents the emotional
state expressed in the video. If the subject is not familiar with
the meaning of a word he can ask for the exact definition in the
instruction manual. It is a test that values complex emotional
aspects that drive social interaction while putting the subject
in “the place of the other person” (Cohen et al., 2001). The
complexity of the test lies in the requirement that the subject
know the meaning of the lexicon referring to emotions and
feelings; based on the complete expression of the face, hemust
identify the emotion that generates that particular expression.
A point is awarded for each correct answer, with a maximum
score of 50.
The test was developed by Prof. Dr. Simon Baron Cohen
of the University of Cambridge and was authorized for use
through a material transfer agreement with the Argentine
School of Cognitive Neurosciences.
3. Results
In the results we present the differences found between the
control group and the psychotic and antisocial patient groups.
In these comparisons, the empathic emotion is represented by
the scores obtained in the Cambridge Mind Reading Test and
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test, and empathic cognition is
measured with the Hinting Task.
3.1 Statistical methods
In order to analyze if there are differences between the three
groups of patients that conform the sample according to the
score obtained in the Hinting, a ONE WAY ANOVA test was
performed. The results showed that there were differences
between the three groups (F(gl, N) = 13.36 (2, 57); p < 0.01;
M (SD) psychosis = 4.70 (2.83), M antisocial (SD) = 7.18
(2.06), M control (SD) = 8.60 (2.21)).
The Bonferroni contrast was used as a test for Post-Hoc
analysis. Differences were observed between patients with
psychosis and patients with antisocial personality disorder
(p < 0.01), as well as between patients with psychosis and
patients in the control group (p < 0.01). No differences were
observed between patients with antisocial personality disorder
and the control group.
In order to corroborate the existence of differences be-
tween the three groups of patients that made up the sample
according to the type of incorrect answers in the Reading of
Faces, a ONE WAY ANOVA test was performed. The re-
sults showed that there were differences between the three
groups (F(gl, N) = 48.67 (2,57); p < 0.01; M (SD) psychosis
= 22.55 (4.27), M antisocial (SD) = 21.76 (5), M control
(SD) = 10.80 (3.15)).
The Bonferroni contrast was used as a test for Post-Hoc
analysis. Differences were observed between patients with
psychosis and patients in the control group (p < 0.01), as
well as between patients with antisocial personality disorder
and patients in the control group (p < 0.01). There were
no differences between patients with antisocial personality
disorder and with psychosis.
To verify if there were differences between the three
groups of patients that made up the sample according to the
type of incorrect answers in the CAM, a ONE WAY ANOVA
test was performed. The results showed that there were differ-
ences between the three groups (F(gl, N) = 50.54 (2,57); p
< 0.01; M (SD) psychosis = 30.50 (5.69), M antisocial (SD)
= 26.59 (5.86), M control (SD) = 14.50 (4.02)).
The Bonferroni contrast was used as a test for Post-Hoc
analysis. Differences were observed between patients with
psychosis and patients in the control group (p < 0.01), as well
as between patients with antisocial personality disorder and
patients in the control group (p < 0.01). No differences were
observed between patients with antisocial personality disorder
and psychosis.
The obtained results demonstrated significant differences
between the experimental groups and the control group. The
group of subjects with a diagnosis of psychosis obtained sta-
tistically significantly lower scores both in the evaluation of
empathic cognition (through administration of the Hinting
Task, see Figure 3) and in the evaluation of empathic emotion
as indicated by the results of the Cambridge Mind Reading
test and Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test.
On the other hand, subjects with a diagnosis of antisocial
personality disorder only obtained lower scores with a degree
of statistical significance in the case of EE evaluation. The
results of the Hinting Task for this group did not show sta-
tistically significant differences regarding the scores of the
control group (see Figure 3).
These results indicate a functional dissociation between
both forms of empathic processing (both cognitive and emo-
tional), with alterations of both systems in psychotic subjects
and specific dysfunctions for emotional processing in subjects
with antisocial personality (scores on emotion recognition
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Figure 3. The differences in the Hinting task scores between the groups
Figure 4. The differences in the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test scores between groups
tests are shown in Figure 4 and 5).
4. Discussion
This study shows an evident double functional dissociation
in tasks related to social cognition. The data obtained in-
dicates that patients diagnosed with psychosis have deficits
in social reasoning and emotion recognition tasks; on the
other hand, patients with antisocial personality disorder only
showed lower scores in emotion recognition tests. These
findings are of interest for the diagnosis and development
of new therapeutic strategies, and add to our understanding
of the empathic ability of people with antisocial personality
disorder.
The results obtained coincide with previous work and
several studies that postulate a dissociation between the ratio-
nal component in social and affective-emotional processing
(Alca´zar-Co´rcoles, Verdejo-Garcı´a, & Bouso-Saiz, 2008).
The Hinting Task explores a form of social reasoning
which dispenses with the affective component for its correct
execution. This function is linked to the cognitive processing
of empathy and is linked to Brodmann’s areas 10 and 11
(Alca´zar-Co´rcoles et al., 2008).
On the contrary, emotion recognition tests on faces, both
in their reading version of the eyes, and in the CAM, require
the integration of emotional information through neurocog-
nitive circuits involving affective structures. This empathic
component of emotion forms part of a complex circuit of face
recognition, identification of emotions and integration of that
information by the frontal operculum (Golan, Baron-Cohen,
& Hill, 2006).
The superior performance obtained by APD patients com-
pared to the psychotic group explains their preserved ability to
manage certain types of interactions in which emotion process-
ing is not involved (Decety & Moriguchi, 2007). It therefore
Differences in social cognition in male prisoners with antisocial personality (Research Article) — 22/24
Figure 5. The differences in the Cambridge mind reading test scores between the groups
follows that they can be skillful swindlers and manipulators
and sustain social bonds, even if they are superficial or report
some benefit for them.
The similarities in deficit scores appear at the time of
identifying facial emotions. The brain dysfunction suffered
by people with APD is related to several factors: the size
and function of the amygdalas (Pardini, Raine, Erickson, &
Loeber, 2014), alterations of the orbital crusts (Raine, Lencz,
Bihrle, LaCasse, & Colletti, 2000), and finally dysfunctions
in the connectivity between these two regions linked to alter-
ations in the structure of the uncinate fascicle (Craig et al.,
2009).
This differentiated dysfunctionality in the social process-
ing of antisocial subjects allows us to perform a more precise
discrimination of their neurocognitive deficits. The neuropsy-
chological tests administered only confirm the neurocognitive
dysfunctions that have been enumerated by other disciplines
(Yang & Raine, 2009).
Several authors have postulated the capacity to regulate
behavior for emotional reasons as a fundamental deficit in
psychopathy (Lykken & Ferrer, 2000; Patrick, 2000). The
The deficits in the processing of fear, in both the perception of
fear itself and in the perception of the expressions of fear, are
part of the disturbances in behavioral inhibition since patients
with psychopathy lack the aversive component that is normally
contributed by fear.
On the other hand, the deficits found in psychotic patients
are more extensive. Psychotic patients have shown deficits in
several domains linked to social cognition: social perception,
emotional perception, attributional style, and mind theory
(Couture, Penn, & Roberts, 2006).
The understanding of empathy as a process composed of
an emotional and a cognitive component is a currently agreed-
upon fact. Empathic cognition (Shamay-Tsoory, Aharon-
Peretz, & Perry, 2009) is associated with the lower frontal
gyrus (area 44) to the emotional processing of empathy and
regions of the ventromedial cortex (areas 10 and 11).
Differentiating these two forms of processing allows us
to conceptually order the study of empathy in a generic way,
but also opens the possibility of the in-depth study of various
mental disorders in our case of antisocial personalities and
psychoses.
The information that emerges from this study can guide
researchers, clinicians and forensic experts in selecting neu-
ropsychological tests for the evaluation of social cognition
and for designing treatment programs that include the rehabil-
itation of detailed dysfunctions to optimize social interaction
by people in processes of reintegration and social adaptation.
Finally, the forensic implications of the study of social
cognition, empathy and moral reasoning would allow the pos-
sibility of new fields of discussion regarding decision-making
in psychopaths, free will and the concept of non-imputability.
Additionally, this information will be indispensable not only
for the work of forensic doctors and psychologists, but also
for judges, prosecutors and all personnel belonging to the field
of justice.
5. Limitations
Because of the nature of our sample and the fact that this is
a research project developed within the penitentiary system,
we have found several limitations. The size of the groups was
reduced due to problems with recruitment and the cases that
had to be discarded. Evaluations of some psychotic patients
had to be suspended because of their referral to other units
or hospitals during the period of the evaluation process, their
inability to complete the tests or the incidence of decompen-
sations. In the case of subjects with antisocial personality
disorder, a large number of cases had to be discarded when
simulation signs were identified and then confirmed with com-
plementary tests. Although it had been clearly explained to
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them that the tests administered would not affect their judicial
situation, several subjects had to be discarded from the sample
because they simulated deficits in order to give the impression
of symptoms or psychiatric alterations that could help their
legal situation. Some of these cases also left the evaluation
process because they found it extensive, difficult or simply
boring.
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